Asymmetric Information and Public Economics: The Mirrlees-Vickrey Nobel Prize by Sandmo, Agnar
/ 300e 0002 Mp 165 Saturday Dec 18 08:41 AM LP–JEP 0002
Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 13, Number 1—Winter 1999—Pages 165–180




O n October 8, 1996, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences announcedthat the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics had been awarded to JamesA. Mirrlees of the University of Cambridge and William Vickrey of Co-
lumbia University ‘‘for their fundamental contributions to the economic theory of
incentives under asymmetric information.’’ The citation seems to refer to contri-
butions which are very much in the area of pure theory. However, those who are
familiar with the work of the two laureates know that—in rather different ways—
their work is very much concerned with matters of public policy. In these reflections
on the nature of their work, I shall take the policy issues as my point of departure
and then draw implications from the policy-oriented work for the more methodo-
logical issue of how to model problems characterized by asymmetric information.
I believe that this way of presenting their main achievements also reflects the work
processes of the laureates themselves.1
The attention given to situations of asymmetric information may be looked at
as a new development in the economics of uncertainty. When that field was being
systematically developed in the first decades of the postwar period by Kenneth
Arrow, Gérard Debreu and many others, the emphasis was on exogenous uncertainty,
the sources of which were to be found outside the economic system itself. It is no
coincidence that a central concept in the formulation of the theory of resource
1 For more detailed descriptions of the work of Vickrey and Mirrlees, the reader should consult the
articles by Drèze (1997) and Dixit and Besley (1997). Both articles are published in the ‘‘Nobel issue’’
of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics, which also contains detailed bibliographies.
j Agnar Sandmo is Professor of Economics at the Norwegian School of Economics and Busi-
ness Administration, and Senior Researcher, the Norwegian Research Centre in Organization
and Management, both in Bergen, Norway. His e-mail address is »agnar.sandmo@nhh.no….
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allocation under uncertainty was that of a state of nature, a description of all rele-
vant aspects of the exogeneous environment that would be of relevance for the
decisionmaker. By contrast, the theory of asymmetric information focuses on the
type of uncertainty where individuals have different types of information, the typical
situation being that they have private information about their own characteristics
that is not directly available to other people, like those responsible for the design
of public policy. Examples of such situations can be found in the relationship be-
tween the employer and his or her employees, where the latter have information
about their own preferences and skills that are not observable by the employer, and
more generally in the area of contracts when buyers and sellers have different
information about the quality of the good to be traded. A provider of a public good
would like to have information about the willingness to pay of the consumers who
benefit from it, but the only people who possess this information are the consumers
themselves. Similarly, an auctioneer does not know the maximum willingness to
pay of the prospective bidders, and a government which is in the process of design-
ing a system of redistributive taxation does not know the ability to pay of the indi-
vidual taxpayer. I begin by taking a closer look at the last of these issues.
Ability to Pay and Redistributive Taxation: An Outline of the
Mirrlees Model
It is an old insight in welfare economics and public finance that the ideal
redistributive tax policy would consist of lump sum transfers. When each taxpayer
has to pay a fixed amount of taxes (or possibly receive a fixed amount of subsidy),
the marginal tax (or subsidy) rate is zero. Therefore, personal choices with respect
to labor supply, saving, portfolio choice and consumption are undistorted by the
tax system and no efficiency losses are associated with a policy of redistribution. In
other words, a system of lump sum transfers involves no tradeoff between equality
and efficiency. This is essentially the second main theorem of welfare economics,
whereby any Pareto optimum can be sustained as a competitive equilibrium, given
an appropriate redistribution of initial resources.
Probably the main reason why we do not have lump sum transfers is that the
implementation of such a system requires information that the tax authorities do not
have. If a redistributive policy is to be based on egalitarian considerations, it requires
that transfers are from those with high to those with low ability to pay. But how do we
know who is who? To say that we may take ability to pay to be measured by income
misses the point about non-distortionary transfers, for income is not an exogeneous
characteristic of the taxpayer. Rather, it is the result of a number of decisions about
labor supply, saving, risk-taking and so on, and an income tax therefore distorts these
choices and creates efficiency losses in the economy. The information that the poli-
cymaker would need to implement an optimal system of lump sum transfers are things
like the inherent productivity of the taxpayer, a person’s built-in energy and drive, and
the like, and this information is clearly beyond the reach of the tax administrator.
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Instead, the tax designers are driven back to the second-best strategy of basing the tax
system on some observable characteristic like income, realizing that the problem then
becomes how to design a system that trades off equality against efficiency in a rational
manner. The modern formulation of this problem is associated with Mirrlees’s path-
breaking 1971 article. But let me first make a brief historical digression.
The old-fashioned utilitarian approach to this issue can be found in works by
Francis Y. Edgeworth (1897) and Arthur C. Pigou (1932). Following them, let us
make the following assumptions:
1) Social welfare is the unweighted sum of individual utility functions;
2) All individuals have the same utility function;
3) Individual utility is an increasing function of income and this function is
strictly concave, which means it has decreasing marginal utility;
4) The total income of society is fixed.
These are obviously very strong assumptions. Note in particular that the first three
assumptions involve more than the empirical assumption that people have the same
preferences; they imply that utility is interpersonally comparable, and this is clearly
an ethical postulate, not an hypothesis that can be settled with reference to empir-
ical data.
With these assumptions, what is the distribution of income that maximizes
social welfare? A moment’s thought will convince us that this consists in each of
the n individuals in society getting a share of exactly 1/nth of society’s total income.
In other words, the optimal distribution of income is one of complete equality. The
optimal redistributive tax system is one that imposes a 100 percent marginal tax
rate on all incomes above the average and uses the revenue to subsidize low-income
earners so as to give everyone the same after-tax income.
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Note that the assumptions imply that the individual consumer and worker has
no choice with respect to the amount of his or her income. This means that the
marginal income tax has no effect on the worker’s or society’s pretax income. Even
at a time when marginal tax rates were low by today’s standard, this was an unreal-
istic assumption, and Pigou (1932) modified the conclusion by saying that the move
towards full equality should be tempered by adverse incentive effects.2 However, he
did not provide any more specific guidelines for how to think about the compromise
between equality and efficiency.
Mirrlees’s 1971 article can in some ways be seen as a direct descendant of the
classical utilitarian approach. Interestingly, he adopts the first three assumptions,
although with the qualification that the utility function now depends both on in-
come (or consumption) and leisure. One may easily forget that this set of assump-
tions, which is by now often referred to as ‘‘standard,’’ was in fact far from standard
in 1971. Classical utilitarianism had gone out of fashion in economics, and speci-
fications of social welfare functions did not usually proceed beyond the very general
formulations familiar from the work of Abram Bergson (1938) and Paul Samuelson
(1947). The fact that we now once more look upon the utilitarian formulation as
familiar and acceptable is to a large extent due to the influence of Mirrlees, who
had demonstrated that it could be put to practical use in the analysis of economic
policy.
The novel feature of his model is that income is no longer exogeneously given.
Gross income is the product of the wage rate and hours worked, with hours, and
accordingly also income, being determined by the maximization of a utility function
which has income (or consumption) and leisure as its arguments.
A salient feature of Mirrlees’s model is that the wage rate is specific to each
individual (which does not preclude that many individuals have the same wage
rate); the wage rate is each taxpayer’s individual characteristic. Had the tax au-
thorities known the wage rates (which are the competitive labor markets’ assessment
of individual workers’ ability or productivity), it could have based a system of lump
sum taxes on these, but by assumption they know only the incomes of individuals.
Here lies the asymmetric information feature of the model. Individuals know their
wage rate and their labor effort; the government knows only the product of the
two, although it knows the statistical frequency distribution of abilities or wage rates
in the population.
If effort could be interpreted simply as hours worked—which is the literal
interpretation of the Mirrlees model—it is perhaps not totally convincing to
insist that hours cannot be observed. If they can, then one can also observe
ability simply by dividing income by hours, and a non-distortionary tax can
then presumably be levied on the basis of ability. But to make sense of the
model, one should interpret it more broadly. The supply of effort is not simply
2 ‘‘The old ‘law of diminishing utility’ [sic] thus leads securely to the proposition: Any cause which
increases the absolute share of real income in the hands of the poor, provided that it does not lead to
a contraction in the size of the national dividend from any point of view, will, in general, increase
economic welfare’’ (Pigou, 1932, p. 89).
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equal to hours but also to an ‘‘intensity’’ factor, which in any case is hard to
measure. Moreover, the wage rate computed by this procedure would in a large
number of cases be a function of past effort, resulting in the accumulation of
experience and human capital. If the individual knew that in the future he or
she would be taxed on the basis of observed ability, the individual would be
faced with a disincentive to attain this ability level, and this is clearly just an-
other version of the basic incentive problem. This and similar concerns can be
seen as being captured indirectly in the simplified framework of the wage-hours
model adopted by Mirrlees.
In the model a redistributive tax has to be levied on income, with the result
that it distorts the labor-leisure decisions. The question Mirrlees asked is the fol-
lowing: What are the properties of the optimal income tax function? Of particular
interest is the question of how the marginal tax rate varies with income. We have
already seen that without incentive effects the utilitarian tax scheme would have an
optimal marginal tax rate of 100 percent. When incentive effects are introduced
we would naturally expect the marginal tax rate to be lower—but can one say
anything about how much?
It turned out that by purely analytical methods Mirrlees could not say a great
deal about the properties of the optimal tax function. He could prove the op-
timal tax function to be continuous and increasing, but he was not able to say
anything very precise about the general relationship between pre-tax income
and the marginal tax rate. To proceed further he made some much more specific
assumptions, such that the utility functions were Cobb-Douglas and that the
frequency distribution was lognormal, and turned to simulation studies. The
results of these studies were somewhat surprising. It turned out that the optimal
tax function was close to linear—although with a positive intercept so that the
tax system was progressive—with an approximately constant marginal tax rate.
As to the nature of the approximation, if anything the marginal tax rate showed
a tendency to decline with income.
In fact, later work by Edmund S. Phelps (1973) and by Mirrlees’ student Jesus
Seade (1977) established the analytical result that the marginal tax rate at the top
of the income scale—that is, for the most able person—should be zero! To inter-
pret this apparently paradoxical result it should be kept in mind that the redistrib-
utive effect depends on the variation of the average tax rate, not the marginal tax
rate. To achieve a redistribution of income, we must have the average tax rate
increasing with income, and this requires the marginal rate to be positive and
higher than the average rate, at least for most of the income range. But at the very
top this point is no longer valid, since there is no one above the person with the
highest income. Distorting this person’s choice of effort has accordingly no redis-
tributional justification, but it does imply an efficiency loss. Hence the top marginal
rate should be zero. It should be stressed that this is a result about limits, and that
it does not necessarily support the view that the rate applicable to, say, the upper
percentile of income earners should be zero.
So far I have been presenting the Mirrlees optimum income tax model with
little explicit attention to its contribution to the theory of asymmetric information.
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In this I am in line with Mirrlees himself, who in his original exposition hardly
mentioned the problem of information,3 while ‘‘asymmetric’’ is a word that does
not even occur in the article. The informational interpretation came later, both in
work by Mirrlees and others.
Vickrey on Optimum Redistribution
Before going on to a discussion of the significance of the Mirrlees article for
the development of the theory of asymmetric information, it is worthwhile to con-
sider William Vickrey’s contribution to this area. This came actually much earlier,
in a 1945 article entitled ‘‘Measuring marginal utility by reactions to risk.’’ Reread-
ing that article today, one is struck by the fact that it contains extremely insightful
discussions of two issues that later came to occupy much attention in the economics
profession. One of these is the derivation of the utilitarian social welfare function
from axioms taken from the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theorem.
The other is the optimum income tax problem, presented in a manner that bears
a strong resemblance to its later formulation by Mirrlees.
On the first of these issues—the derivation of the utilitarian social welfare
function—the standard reference in the literature is John Harsanyi (1955). Har-
sanyi postulated that the proper way to evaluate the welfare of society is to think of
oneself as making a choice behind a veil of uncertainty about one’s personal char-
acteristics. The choice is between lotteries, each lottery pertaining to a particular
country or society, where the prize in each of the lotteries is the equal probability
of becoming a particular individual in that society. Harsanyi showed formally that
if the way a person evaluated the lotteries conformed to the rationality axioms of
von Neumann and Morgenstern, each person would evaluate each lottery in terms
of its expected utility; that is, as the sum across all individuals of 1/n times the utility
of becoming one particular person. But apart from the scale factor 1/n (which is
irrelevant as long as population is constant), this is equivalent to the utilitarian sum
of utilities. This idea is also clearly and explicitly formulated, although with less
formal rigor, in the Vickrey (1945, p. 329) article:
If utility is defined as that quantity the mathematical expectation of which is
maximized by an individual making choices involving risk, then to maximize
the aggregate of such utility over the population is equivalent to choosing that
distribution of income which such an individual would select were he asked
3 Paradoxically, the only point at which the word ‘‘information’’ occurs is in the context of a list of
assumptions underlying the analysis in which Mirrlees (1971, p. 176) writes that the state ‘‘is supposed
to have perfect information about the individuals in the economy, their utilities, and consequently, their
actions.’’ This statement seems to go directly against the later emphasis on the asymmetric information
assumption, but there is of course a sense in which the quoted statement is true; that is, the state has
perfect information about individuals, contingent on their ability, and this is clearly what Mirrlees had in
mind.
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which of various variants of the economy he would like to become a member
of, assuming that once he selects a given economy with a given distribution
of income he has an equal chance of landing in the shoes of each member
of it.
If in addition to the basic von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms it is assumed that
individuals are risk averse, so that they have strictly concave utility functions, then
they will also display risk aversion in their choice between hypothetical income
distributions. In other words, risk aversion implies inequality aversion.
Having established this foundation for the utilitarian social welfare function,
Vickrey (1945) goes on to point out the implication that if all have the same utility
function and if total income is fixed, the social optimum will be one of complete
equality. But the assumption of fixed income abstracts from the incentive problem,
so that ‘‘with these practical effects to consider, the question of the ideal distribu-
tion of income, and hence of the proper progression of the tax system, becomes a
matter of compromise between equality and incentives’’ (p. 329). He then formu-
lates an explicit analytical model to analyze this point, assuming (as did Mirrlees
later on) that there is a continuum of individuals and writing the problem as one
in the calculus of variations. Having derived the first-order Euler conditions, how-
ever, he despairs of arriving at an economically meaningful solution to the problem,
commenting that ‘‘even in this simplified form the problem resists any facile solu-
tion’’ (p. 331).
In his treatment of these central problems of welfare and public economics,
Vickrey was far ahead of his time. Still, his analysis stopped significantly short of the
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Mirrlees contribution, because it was the latter who found a set of assumptions
which made the problem solvable in a way that brought out the economic impli-
cations, both for theory and policy. But the puzzle is why during the next couple
of decades nobody was inspired by the Vickrey article to continue work on the
problem that he sketched but did not finish; as witnessed by the editors of the
recent collection of his papers, Richard Arnott, Kenneth Arrow, Anthony Atkinson
and Jacques Drèze (Vickrey, 1994), this cannot have been for the lack of attentive
and gifted students. The fact that the paper came out in Econometrica should also
have assured it high visibility among analytically-minded economists.4 Whatever the
explanation, the fact remains that the paper stands as an isolated attempt to come
to grips with the problem of optimum income taxation two and a half decades
before the Mirrlees breakthrough.
This leads us to the question of exactly what it was about the Mirrlees formu-
lation that made him succeed where Vickrey had to give up. In trying to answer this
question we shall also get closer to the more general implications of his analysis for
the theory of asymmetric information.
Taxation, Information and Moral Hazard
As we have seen, a basic assumption of the Mirrlees model is that the govern-
ment cannot observe the individual’s wage rate (or ‘‘ability’’) and labor supply
separately. If it could do so, it could impose a lump sum tax conditional on the
ability parameter itself, which would obviously, given the assumptions of the model,
have been non-distortionary. In that case the utilitarian tax optimum would have
had a system of lump sum taxes that would be increasing in inherent abilities. To
understand the properties of the second best optimal tax system it is useful to have
the first best solution at the back of one’s mind. Can we be sure that by taxing
income we also tax the more able more than the less able? Clearly, this will be true
only if the more able actually decide to earn more income, and for this to be the
case we need to make some assumptions about their preferences. From the theory
of labor supply we know that an increase in the wage rate has both an income and
a substitution effect on income (or consumption). The substitution effect is positive,
while the income effect can be of either sign; the indifference map therefore has
to have the property that the income effect is not too negative. The property that
Mirrlees identified to ensure this, which is now known as ‘‘single crossing,’’5 has
4 In addition to the quality of the journal, one might think that the author’s academic affiliation would
also be of importance for the attention given to an article by a young economist. In Econometrica this is
given as ‘‘Civilian Public Service Camp No. 114, Bluemont, Virginia.’’ What this suggested to readers at
that time I am unable to guess.
5 Technically, single crossing refers to a diagram showing the indifference curves for a high-ability and
a low-ability worker with respect to income before and after tax; for example, see Mirrlees (1997,
p. 1316). When these indifference curves cross only once, the result is that both utility and gross income
will be increasing functions of the wage rate. Accordingly, when the tax is an increasing function of
income, those with higher ability and utility pay more tax. It should be noted that the assumption that
consumption is a normal good is sufficient to ensure single crossing; the assumption is therefore one
which is intuitively reasonable.
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turned out to be of major interest for the whole field of the economics of asym-
metric information. Given the right incentives individuals will, through their choice
of effort and income, reveal their ability ranking although the individual abilities
remain unobservable by the government.
The Mirrlees optimal income tax schedule can accordingly be seen as the so-
lution to a problem of optimal design of incentives under asymmetric information,
and it is clear that this class of problems is much larger than the particular problem
to which Mirrlees addressed himself in his 1971 article. Another type of asymmetric
information problem had been formulated and analyzed in a celebrated article by
George Akerlof (1970), who studied the problem of adverse selection. While his
point of departure is the used car market, the analysis has interesting applications
to insurance. If the insurance company only has statistical information about the
risk characteristics of their customers, an actuarially fair policy will be unattractive
to low-risk individuals. If a special policy is designed for these, the company has to
make sure that the two policies are designed in such a way that each type buys the
policy that is designed for it; by their choice of policy, they reveal their type. The
problem of optimum income taxation may similarly be seen as constrained by self-
selection; it should not encourage high-ability individuals to pose as low-ability types
by working less. This approach to the theory of optimal income taxation was pio-
neered by Stiglitz (1982), who thereby succeeded in throwing new light on the
informational basis of the tax scheme.
The other main type of asymmetric information problem is what is now
known as moral hazard. The origin of this term is in insurance, where the in-
surance company has to realize that an insurance policy may change the behav-
ior of the insured in a way which makes the event covered by the insurance policy
more likely to happen. Fire insurance may make homeowners exercise less care
to prevent fires, unemployment insurance may cause workers to exercise less
care in holding on to their jobs, and so on. It is difficult for the insurance com-
pany to determine, once a fire has occurred, whether it was due to an exoge-
neous event or to negligence. Another application of the concept is to agency
problems, where an agent enters into a contract requiring the agent to exert
himself in the best interests of a principal. The principal, who is only able to
observe the result, cannot determine the extent to which this is due to the
agent’s effort or to some exogeneous cause.
The problem both for the insurance company and the principal is to design a
contract which gives the insured or the agent appropriate incentives to provide care
or exert effort, while at the same time satisfying their need (assuming that they are
risk averse) for protection against uncertainty. In such a contract there has to be a
tradeoff between the two considerations. If all emphasis were to be put on the risk
protection consideration, this would call for complete insurance coverage and a
fixed salary for the agent. At the other extreme, a maximum weight on incentives
would call for no insurance at all and an agent remuneration in proportion to the
observed result.
It is clear that there is a strong similarity between these examples of contract
design in the presence of moral hazard and the Mirrlees problem of tax design.
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The counterpart to the outcome of complete risk coverage in the two examples
above would be complete income equality with no reward to effort at the margin.
A maximum weight on incentives would entail a zero marginal tax rate for all work-
ers, possibly combined with a head tax to cover the need for tax revenue for other
purposes than the purely redistributive. Behind this similarity lies an informational
problem with exactly the same structure as those of insurance contracts or agent
remuneration. The government can only observe the taxpayer’s gross income, not
the extent to which this is due to ability or effort.
Mirrlees (1974, 1976) himself has made very important contributions to the
general theory of incentive design under moral hazard. Among other things, he
made further progress in characterizing the tradeoff between risk protection and
incentives, showing for example how optimal contract design depended on the
agent’s degree of risk aversion and the degree to which the agent’s effort could be
assessed on the basis of information about outcomes. In so doing, he gradually
came to emphasize more strongly the information-theoretic content of his 1971
contribution. Thus, 15 years later Mirrlees (1986, p. 1197) wrote emphatically that
‘‘The central element in the theory is information,’’ thus stressing the informa-
tional basis for the second best constraints on taxation that were more implicit in
his (and others’) early work on optimum taxation.
Vickrey on Auctions
As already noted, auctions, particularly of the closed form whereby each bidder
can only bid once and without knowledge of the bids of the others, provide another
example of situations characterized by asymmetric information. The auctioneer
does not know the willingness to pay of the individual buyers, nor does the individ-
ual buyer know the reservation prices of the buyer’s competitors. Efficiency calls
for the object of the auction—like a work of art, a piece of property, a right to
exploit a natural resource—to go to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay.
But how do you design an auction of this kind in such a way that the person who
submits the highest bid is also the one with the highest willingness to pay? This
problem was taken up in two famous articles by Vickrey (1961, 1962), which prob-
ably represent his single most important and influential contribution as a theorist.
As a starting point for understanding the central result of Vickrey’s analysis,
one may consider the problem of the price that would emerge at an open auction
where everyone bid up to their true willingness to pay. As the bid level increases,
more and more prospective buyers withdraw until only two are left. As the price
reaches the level of the willingness to pay of the person with the second highest
reservation price, that buyer is on the margin of withdrawal. The other person,
realizing this, has only to raise the price marginally above that level to secure the
object for himself. The object therefore goes to the highest bidder, who pays only
the price corresponding to the second highest bidder’s willingness to pay.
What Vickrey did was to design a mechanism for closed auctions which exactly
replicates this outcome. Called the second price auction, the mechanism is simply
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that the object goes to the highest bidder, who is however only to pay the price
corresponding to the second highest bid. The point is that this leads each buyer to
reveal his or her true willingness to pay and to abstain from ‘‘strategic bidding.’’
Suppose you consider submitting a bid which is below your highest price. You then
run the risk that someone else will submit a bid which is higher than yours but still
below your highest price. That buyer will then get the object, and you will be worse
off than if you got the object at your highest price. Now suppose that you consider
bidding above your highest price. Then someone might submit a bid below yours
but above your true willingness to pay. You would then have to buy the object at
that price and suffer a loss. Your best strategy is therefore to bid an amount equal
to your true willingness to pay. The auction mechanism is such that you are led in
your own best interest to reveal private information.
Vickrey was not only interested in the efficiency properties of auctions; he also
asked the question of which form of auction would yield the highest income to the
seller. He compared the second price closed auction with the first price auction,
where the object also goes to the highest bidder, but where the price paid by the
highest bidder is equal to the high bid. He then compared these two closed auctions
with two forms of open auctions, the English and the Dutch. In the English auction
the auctioneer asks for successively higher bids, and the bidding stops when no
further increases are forthcoming; the object then goes to the highest bidder, who
pays according to his bid. The Dutch auction has the auctioneer starting at a high
price and then moves it down until someone accepts to pay that price. Vickrey
showed that the English and second price auctions are strategically equivalent, and
so are the Dutch and the first price auctions.6 He also showed that there exists a
certain set of assumptions (involving, among other assumptions, risk neutrality
among buyers) which ensures the strategic equivalence of all four auctions, making
them also equivalent from the seller’s point of view in terms of revenue.
The study of auctions is obviously of great interest in itself, since it is an im-
portant allocation mechanism in many areas of economic life. But a notable feature
of Vickrey’s analysis is that it also has interesting applications outside of auctions in
the narrow sense of the word. In the early 1970s, there emerged an interesting new
literature on the revelation of preferences for public goods. From Samuelson
(1954) we know that an efficient supply of public goods is characterized by the
condition that the sum of marginal willingnesses to pay over all consumers should
be equal to the marginal cost. But how do you get consumers to reveal their will-
ingness to pay? Edward Clarke (1971) and Theodore Groves and Martin Loeb
(1975) showed that this comes about if consumers are told that they will have to
pay a price equal to the marginal cost minus the sum of the marginal willingnesses
6 To better understand the equivalence between the closed first price auction and the Dutch auction,
consider the popular idea of the ‘‘winner’s curse,’’ according to which the winner always pays too much.
If people have different estimates of the value of the object for which they bid, the winner almost by
definition will have a high estimate of its value and therefore be more likely to be disappointed. If the
bidders are aware of this point, they might be led both in the first price and Dutch auctions to be cautious
and hold back their bids even at the risk of seeing the object being secured by someone else.
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to pay of all others. This corresponds to the net social cost that they impose on
society by their own decision. There is an obvious similarity here to Vickrey’s second
price auction. There the bidder also pays the cost imposed on others by his own
successful bid, which, since the object of the auction is a private good, is simply the
second highest bid.
Marginal Cost Pricing and Commodity Taxation
A clear implication of the efficiency theorems of welfare economics is that a
competitive equilibrium is efficient when prices equal marginal costs. This general
insight has important implications for several different fields of applications, such
as public utility pricing, cost-benefit analysis and commodity taxation. The general
area is one to which the two laureates have made some of their most important and
widely-cited contributions, although it is only indirectly related to the problem of
asymmetric information.
Vickrey’s contributions to the literature on marginal cost pricing are less con-
cerned with fundamentals than with practical implementation. He takes the desir-
ability of the principle more or less as given and concerns himself chiefly with
setting out guidelines for its practical implementation. He discusses, for example,
how depreciation should be taken into account in marginal cost pricing, and how
prices should be set when, for administrative reasons, different uses have to be
priced uniformly. As an example of his approach to these problems, it is interesting
to look at one of his most cited papers in the area, his 1955 proposal for revising
the fare structure on the New York subway. This is a very detailed study of cost and
demand conditions, including the nature of congestion externalities, and the anal-
ysis is carried to the point where he actually presents numerical estimates of the
efficiency costs for a number of alternative fare schemes. Although Vickrey’s work
on marginal cost pricing presents little in the way of formal theory, the attentive
reader will discover in these articles many of the themes that have been in the
foreground in the more formal research on optimal pricing and formed such an
important part of the public finance literature since about 1970.7
Mirrlees’s work in this area is concerned on the one hand with commodity
taxation and on the other hand with cost-benefit analysis. His major contribution
in the first of these fields are his celebrated two articles with Peter Diamond (1971)
on optimal commodity taxation. Appearing as they did in the same year as Mirrlees’s
paper on income taxation, they became another landmark at the start of a devel-
opment which was soon being referred to as ‘‘the new public economics.’’8 The
7 For a more detailed description of Vickrey’s contribution in this area and its relationship to the work
carried out by French economists, particularly Marcel Boiteux, during the same period, the reader should
consult the articles by Drèze (1995) in this journal, and also Drèze (1997).
8 My own first encounter with the new public economics was at the European Winter Meeting of the
Econometric Society in January 1968, where Mirrlees presented an early version of his joint paper with
Diamond. I remember the excitement that I felt at being presented with this new development which
seemed to promise a much more constructive role for theory in the analysis of policy issues, and the
experience may well have been decisive for my own move into public economics.
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problem analyzed in these articles is how to characterize an optimal structure of
indirect taxes, given that lump sum taxes cannot be used. This problem had already
been studied by Frank Ramsey (1927) and also in a remarkable 1951 memorandum
by Paul Samuelson, which was published only in 1986. But Diamond and Mirrlees
carried the analysis much further, providing an existence theorem for a tax-
distorted economy, integrating a number of characterization results and—not the
least of their achievements—proving what is now commonly referred to as the
Diamond-Mirrlees theorem. This theorem says that in the absence of consumer
income from profits, either as the result of constant returns to scale or from a 100
percent profits tax, production efficiency is desirable, implying that transactions
between producers should not be taxed.
There are some obvious links between Mirrlees’s work on optimal commodity
taxes and his contributions to cost-benefit analysis, where the most important single
publication is Little and Mirrlees (1974). This book is to a large extent concerned
with the determination of the correct shadow prices to be used in the evaluation
of public projects, particularly in developing countries, and one of the main rec-
ommendations of the book is that the choice of shadow or accounting prices should
be such as to achieve production efficiency in the public sector.
On the face of it, the work by Vickrey and Mirrlees on optimum pricing and
commodity taxation has less to do with asymmetric information than their contri-
butions in the other fields that have been surveyed above. However, there is a
connection. This is simply that the rationale for the second best nature of the
problem is the absence of lump sum taxes, and the reason that these are assumed
to be nonexistent is precisely the informational problem that also underlies the
analysis of the optimal income tax. In this sense, the characterization of the work
of the two laureates as being the study of incentives with asymmetric information
has a broader applicability than simply to their core contributions to the analysis
of this problem.
Some Asymmetries of Research Styles
When the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences announced the joint award of
the Nobel Prize to Mirrlees and Vickrey there were doubtless a number of econo-
mists who were surprised at this particular coupling of names. However, as we have
seen, there is much justification for the joint award in terms of the main theoretical
achievements of the two laureates. The puzzlement in the economics community
may to a large extent have been due to the difference in research styles. Vickrey
was a broad-based general public finance economist whose work spanned more or
less the whole field from micro- to macroeconomics, from pure theory to very de-
tailed applications. Mirrlees is a mathematical economist whose work has been
much more concentrated on one particular set of issues. Both of them can be
considered to be ‘‘applied theorists,’’ being interested in economic theory as a tool
for better understanding of important issues of public policy. But whereas Mirrlees’s
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writings are almost exclusively directed to the scientific community, Vickrey’s work
clearly attempts to reach out to governmental decisionmakers.
In his presidential address to the American Economic Association, Vickrey
(1993, p. 1) wrote: ‘‘Economists should see to it that market prices correctly reflect
the relevant marginal social cost of various alternatives. I have devoted a major part
of my career to the promotion of such marginal-cost pricing, but thus far with a
notable lack of practical success outside academia.’’ The address is otherwise a
passionate plea for economists to take a strong stand on the desirability of moving
rapidly towards a state of full employment and not to ‘‘tie our hands with financial
shibboleths’’ (p. 10). If it had not been for Vickrey’s untimely death, only two days
after the announcement of the Prize award, my guess is that he would have delivered
a Nobel Prize Lecture very much along the same lines as his Presidential Address
to the AEA.
Mirrlees’s Prize Lecture (Mirrlees, 1997) is written in a totally different style.
It contains no references to current issues of economic policy, but many more
references to the academic literature (Vickrey’s AEA presidential address contains
none). Mirrlees describes some basic ideas in welfare economics and public finance
that can be traced back to Adam Smith, and considers the state of economic theory
at the time when he made his pathbreaking contributions to optimal tax theory
around 1970. He then goes on to discuss the main theoretical achievements in the
literature since then as well as some of the remaining unsolved problems. There
are no complaints about lack of success outside academia.
This contrast in styles should most definitely not be taken as a lack of concern
with policy on Mirrlees’s part or a neglect of the literature in Vickrey’s case. I
believe, however, that it demonstrates two different perceptions of the role of the
economist in the study of policy. Vickrey was obviously deeply concerned with hav-
ing his ideas adopted by policymakers in the fairly short run. Mirrlees, on the other
hand, is more concerned with influencing other economists, whose research may
be more directly relevant for detailed decisions about policy.
Another asymmetry between the two laureates lies, as I have already noted, in
the speed with which their ideas have been adopted by the academic community.
Mirrlees’s main contributions have been instant successes. His work on optimal
income and commodity taxation and on moral hazard gained immediate recogni-
tion as being contributions of major significance. Public finance economists were
quick to perceive that a revolution had occurred in their area, and that Mirrlees
was one of its leaders. Many economists all over the world began to work in the
field that he had started to develop. In Vickrey’s case I have already remarked on
the fact that his 1945 Econometrica article was largely neglected in the literature, in
spite of the fact that it contains very clear and constructive formulations of models
that became famous much later through the work of Harsanyi and Mirrlees (neither
of whom refers to it). It is not easy to know why. Let me offer a few suggestions.
It is always tempting to suggest as an explanation for this kind of puzzle that
in 1945 the time for this problem had not yet come. This sounds dangerously like
a truism, but there may be some real content to it. It is often the case that when a
theoretical breakthrough occurs, there are in effect many people who have been
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thinking along similar lines. These people first provide a receptive audience for the
pioneering article and then are ready to start working in the new field that has
been opened up. This was clearly the case in 1971, when a number of other econ-
omists were concerned with the development of models of optimal second best
taxation, and it was evidently not the case in 1945, when the mind of the profession
was on other issues. In the 1970s, references to Mirrlees’s articles were all over the
journal literature; in the 1940s, Vickrey’s paper created little notice. In addition,
what we now see as the most important contributions of the Vickrey article were
not clearly advertised by its title, and the author did not really follow them up
himself. By contrast, Vickrey’s work on auctions gained much more rapid recog-
nition, both in auction theory itself and in the more general area of preference
revelation mechanisms.
The central importance given to problems of asymmetric information in the
work of Mirrlees and Vickrey has made it possible to formulate theoretical models
with informational structures that are much more easily recognizable by actual
decisionmakers. Thus, while their work contains a number of important contribu-
tions to ‘‘pure theory,’’ it is also remarkable for bringing theory closer to the study
of concrete problems of economic policy.
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